What happens to the contemplative intellect when the reality of its objects is denied? A reflection on perception, practice, and the intelligibility of being
So right on and clear, thank you! I'm a pragmatist (and phenomenologist, I guess) at heart, but you make a good case for how too much pragmatism collapses in this case. I wonder if part of what's missing perceptually is an ability to relate to a whole third category of reality? I guess that's sort of how I've reconciled this personally, and the ability to take that seriously does seem like something that has grown as I've practiced it.
You know, our knowledge of things is so partial and perspectival that a certain amount of pragmatism is good and inevitable. I just think we run into problems if we organize our knowledge seeking around usefulness alone.
Very interesting piece Adam. I have two follow-up questions that I would like to put to you. The first concerns the principle of parsimony and naturalism. One reason moderns were led to eliminate substantial forms is that they do not appear to offer (enough) explanatory value in naturalistic endeavors. Thus, by application of Ockham's Razor, a more elegant ontology is preferred. What do you think of this? Do we have to deny (or at least, restrain) naturalism as our guiding framework? The second question is related and concerns the kind of intelligibility that substantial forms are supposed to generate. On your view, by what measure can "the contemplative intellect" be considered "a kind of knowledge" if its objects of perception, substantial forms, do not enter into the space of reasons? (On an aside: I suspect that one could see Spinoza's third kind of knowledge or "intuitive science" as consisting in an attempt to give an answer to a similar question.)
Unless I've misunderstood the article, it would be possible to strongly disagree with it. As the Upanishads tell us, paraphrasing, to see the voidness of one form is to see the voidness of all.
Until we can see that forms have no substance or essence we cannot correctly perceive forms as what they are. Here a 'form' would be any thing, thought or concept. For the Perennial philosophy no 'thing' really exists or ever really happens. You appear to be saying that this view damages our ability to live in the world of forms, (is this it?) but this seems to the very reverse of the truth.
Perhaps I've misunderstood your argument so I won't make a long counter-argument. I have the impression, however, that it is open to some important and telling objections. To say that forms are contingent and that consciousness and reality transcends the world of forms is not to create a wasteland, just a deeper perspective.
I think what he's saying is that just like how Upanishads would've come up with the knowledge (Theoria) about the "voidness of all", by being more perceptive to Form or its appearance that is immanent, this will yield more knowledge and improve our contemplative faculty. The worry here is that this thinking ability is undergoing atrophy because our current world views a mere appearance as an illusion and therefore not useful or less useful than instrumental abilities such as physics and maths. It's a call to develop our contemplative faculties so that Form is more intelligible through attention-giving practices. I'm sure the Upanishads and Zen buddhists think of Form when they say there is no Form - you are actually agreeing with the deeper perspective he's laying out for us.
Thanks for the clarification. I'm not quite sure that we're disagreeing here. The issue for me arises in the first sentence quoted.
"Without forms, not only language and thought but reality itself collapses."
A Buddhist would say that it is only when language and thought have collapsed' that reality is revealed.
This is not to deny form as appearance or to dismiss it as insignificant, but only to say that form is not fundamental or even truly real. having only a dependent existence. Buddhists still feel pain when they stub their toe on the bedpost, but they do not reify their toe, the bedpost or the pain. For a Buddhist nothing really exists or ever really happens.
There is no danger of this insight or view damaging our thinking ability or our ability to do science and philosophy, albeit it may lead us not to do so much of it. After all, Erwin Schrodinger enthusiastically endorsed the Upanishads.
So right on and clear, thank you! I'm a pragmatist (and phenomenologist, I guess) at heart, but you make a good case for how too much pragmatism collapses in this case. I wonder if part of what's missing perceptually is an ability to relate to a whole third category of reality? I guess that's sort of how I've reconciled this personally, and the ability to take that seriously does seem like something that has grown as I've practiced it.
You know, our knowledge of things is so partial and perspectival that a certain amount of pragmatism is good and inevitable. I just think we run into problems if we organize our knowledge seeking around usefulness alone.
Very interesting piece Adam. I have two follow-up questions that I would like to put to you. The first concerns the principle of parsimony and naturalism. One reason moderns were led to eliminate substantial forms is that they do not appear to offer (enough) explanatory value in naturalistic endeavors. Thus, by application of Ockham's Razor, a more elegant ontology is preferred. What do you think of this? Do we have to deny (or at least, restrain) naturalism as our guiding framework? The second question is related and concerns the kind of intelligibility that substantial forms are supposed to generate. On your view, by what measure can "the contemplative intellect" be considered "a kind of knowledge" if its objects of perception, substantial forms, do not enter into the space of reasons? (On an aside: I suspect that one could see Spinoza's third kind of knowledge or "intuitive science" as consisting in an attempt to give an answer to a similar question.)
Unless I've misunderstood the article, it would be possible to strongly disagree with it. As the Upanishads tell us, paraphrasing, to see the voidness of one form is to see the voidness of all.
Until we can see that forms have no substance or essence we cannot correctly perceive forms as what they are. Here a 'form' would be any thing, thought or concept. For the Perennial philosophy no 'thing' really exists or ever really happens. You appear to be saying that this view damages our ability to live in the world of forms, (is this it?) but this seems to the very reverse of the truth.
Perhaps I've misunderstood your argument so I won't make a long counter-argument. I have the impression, however, that it is open to some important and telling objections. To say that forms are contingent and that consciousness and reality transcends the world of forms is not to create a wasteland, just a deeper perspective.
I think what he's saying is that just like how Upanishads would've come up with the knowledge (Theoria) about the "voidness of all", by being more perceptive to Form or its appearance that is immanent, this will yield more knowledge and improve our contemplative faculty. The worry here is that this thinking ability is undergoing atrophy because our current world views a mere appearance as an illusion and therefore not useful or less useful than instrumental abilities such as physics and maths. It's a call to develop our contemplative faculties so that Form is more intelligible through attention-giving practices. I'm sure the Upanishads and Zen buddhists think of Form when they say there is no Form - you are actually agreeing with the deeper perspective he's laying out for us.
Thanks for the clarification. I'm not quite sure that we're disagreeing here. The issue for me arises in the first sentence quoted.
"Without forms, not only language and thought but reality itself collapses."
A Buddhist would say that it is only when language and thought have collapsed' that reality is revealed.
This is not to deny form as appearance or to dismiss it as insignificant, but only to say that form is not fundamental or even truly real. having only a dependent existence. Buddhists still feel pain when they stub their toe on the bedpost, but they do not reify their toe, the bedpost or the pain. For a Buddhist nothing really exists or ever really happens.
There is no danger of this insight or view damaging our thinking ability or our ability to do science and philosophy, albeit it may lead us not to do so much of it. After all, Erwin Schrodinger enthusiastically endorsed the Upanishads.