What happens to the contemplative intellect when the reality of its objects is denied? A reflection on perception, practice, and the intelligibility of being
So right on and clear, thank you! I'm a pragmatist (and phenomenologist, I guess) at heart, but you make a good case for how too much pragmatism collapses in this case. I wonder if part of what's missing perceptually is an ability to relate to a whole third category of reality? I guess that's sort of how I've reconciled this personally, and the ability to take that seriously does seem like something that has grown as I've practiced it.
You know, our knowledge of things is so partial and perspectival that a certain amount of pragmatism is good and inevitable. I just think we run into problems if we organize our knowledge seeking around usefulness alone.
Very interesting piece Adam. I have two follow-up questions that I would like to put to you. The first concerns the principle of parsimony and naturalism. One reason moderns were led to eliminate substantial forms is that they do not appear to offer (enough) explanatory value in naturalistic endeavors. Thus, by application of Ockham's Razor, a more elegant ontology is preferred. What do you think of this? Do we have to deny (or at least, restrain) naturalism as our guiding framework? The second question is related and concerns the kind of intelligibility that substantial forms are supposed to generate. On your view, by what measure can "the contemplative intellect" be considered "a kind of knowledge" if its objects of perception, substantial forms, do not enter into the space of reasons? (On an aside: I suspect that one could see Spinoza's third kind of knowledge or "intuitive science" as consisting in an attempt to give an answer to a similar question.)
Unless I've misunderstood the article, it would be possible to strongly disagree with it. As the Upanishads tell us, paraphrasing, to see the voidness of one form is to see the voidness of all.
Until we can see that forms have no substance or essence we cannot correctly perceive forms as what they are. Here a 'form' would be any thing, thought or concept. For the Perennial philosophy no 'thing' really exists or ever really happens. You appear to be saying that this view damages our ability to live in the world of forms, (is this it?) but this seems to the very reverse of the truth.
Perhaps I've misunderstood your argument so I won't make a long counter-argument. I have the impression, however, that it is open to some important and telling objections. To say that forms are contingent and that consciousness and reality transcends the world of forms is not to create a wasteland, just a deeper perspective.
So right on and clear, thank you! I'm a pragmatist (and phenomenologist, I guess) at heart, but you make a good case for how too much pragmatism collapses in this case. I wonder if part of what's missing perceptually is an ability to relate to a whole third category of reality? I guess that's sort of how I've reconciled this personally, and the ability to take that seriously does seem like something that has grown as I've practiced it.
You know, our knowledge of things is so partial and perspectival that a certain amount of pragmatism is good and inevitable. I just think we run into problems if we organize our knowledge seeking around usefulness alone.
Very interesting piece Adam. I have two follow-up questions that I would like to put to you. The first concerns the principle of parsimony and naturalism. One reason moderns were led to eliminate substantial forms is that they do not appear to offer (enough) explanatory value in naturalistic endeavors. Thus, by application of Ockham's Razor, a more elegant ontology is preferred. What do you think of this? Do we have to deny (or at least, restrain) naturalism as our guiding framework? The second question is related and concerns the kind of intelligibility that substantial forms are supposed to generate. On your view, by what measure can "the contemplative intellect" be considered "a kind of knowledge" if its objects of perception, substantial forms, do not enter into the space of reasons? (On an aside: I suspect that one could see Spinoza's third kind of knowledge or "intuitive science" as consisting in an attempt to give an answer to a similar question.)
Unless I've misunderstood the article, it would be possible to strongly disagree with it. As the Upanishads tell us, paraphrasing, to see the voidness of one form is to see the voidness of all.
Until we can see that forms have no substance or essence we cannot correctly perceive forms as what they are. Here a 'form' would be any thing, thought or concept. For the Perennial philosophy no 'thing' really exists or ever really happens. You appear to be saying that this view damages our ability to live in the world of forms, (is this it?) but this seems to the very reverse of the truth.
Perhaps I've misunderstood your argument so I won't make a long counter-argument. I have the impression, however, that it is open to some important and telling objections. To say that forms are contingent and that consciousness and reality transcends the world of forms is not to create a wasteland, just a deeper perspective.